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ABSTRACT
This Article examines the idea of betraying or being disloyal to one’s own country as a matter
of criminal law. First, the Article defines crimes of disloyalty as involving failures to
prioritize one’s own country’s interests through participating in efforts to directly undermine
core institutional resources the country requires to protect itself or otherwise advance its
interests by force. Second, this Article canvasses various potential arguments for the
existence of a duty not to be disloyal to one’s own country and argues that they fail. Finally,
this Article argues that we should interpret the wrong of disloyalty crimes as involving not
betrayal or infidelity, but transgression of political boundaries. That is, the relevant wrong
here is rooted in the ideas of separation of powers and assignments of roles between citizens
and the state, and we should thus conceive crimes of disloyalty as crimes of usurpation and
evaluate the moral rights and wrongs of such crimes accordingly.

INTRODUCTION
When two people, an American citizen and a Russian citizen, commit the crime of
delivering United States military secrets to a foreign government, is there a difference
between the two cases? A common reaction to this scenario is that the American is a
traitor to his country and should be condemned for his betrayal and that such a
characterization is inappropriate for the Russian. This Article asks whether we can
justify this intuition.
A natural starting point in considering crimes of betrayal of the country1 is the
crime of treason. The word treason has its roots in the word “to betray,”2 and “intent to
*
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This Article focuses on the idea of disloyalty to one’s country, and unless otherwise specified this Article
uses “disloyalty” and “disloyalty to the state” interchangeably. The concept of disloyalty, of course, has a
scope that is much broader than that. One can be disloyal not just to the country, but also to persons,
groups, organizations, and perhaps even ideals. See, e.g., STUART P. GREEN, LYING, CHEATING AND
STEALING: A MORAL THEORY OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 98-99 (2006); John Kleinig, Patriotic Loyalty, in
PATRIOTISM: PHILOSOPHICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES 37, 39 (Igor Primoratz & Aleksandar Pavković
eds., 2007) (observing that “loyalty can be developed in relation to almost any associational object”). And
not all “crimes of disloyalty” have to do with disloyalty to the country. For instance, disloyalty is a
**
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betray” the United States is an element of the crime of treason.3 Also, only those who
“owe allegiance to the United States” 4 can commit the crime of treason,5 which is
consistent with the common understanding that in order for one to betray there has to be a
preexisting relationship between the betrayer and the betrayed.6 Hence, when Sarah Palin
accused Wikileaks of committing a “treasonous act,”7 it was quickly and rightly pointed
out that Julian Assange, not being an American, was “incapable of committing ‘treason’”
against the United States.8
Prosecutions for treason are rare.9 More common are espionage cases.10 Robert
Hanssen, Aldrich Ames, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg are some of the more well-known of
those convicted of espionage-related charges in the United States. Technically speaking,
the crimes they were convicted of were not crimes of betrayal or disloyalty. Passing state
secrets to foreign governments or other enemies of the United States is a federal crime no
matter who commits them and is not a crime limited to those who “owe allegiance” to the
United States.11
At the same time, it is difficult to avoid at least a whiff of disloyalty when an
American commits the crime of delivering military secrets to a foreign government “with
intent or reason to believe that it is to be used to the injury of the United States or to the
advantage of a foreign nation,” which is the mens rea requirement of one of the espionage
crimes.12 No such inference of disloyalty would be appropriate if the same crime were
committed by a Russian or an Australian. It is thus no surprise that when American
significant concept in the area of white-collar crimes. See GREEN, supra, at 98-106; see also id. at 193-211
(discussing bribery). While some of the ideas considered in this Article may have broader applicability or
bear resemblance to the idea of disloyalty in different contexts, the argument this Article develops is
specific to the idea of disloyalty to the country only.
2
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE (2011).
3
Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 29 (1945).
4
18 U.S.C. § 2381 (2006).
5
The crime of treason is defined also in the Constitution, but its formulation does not include the
requirement of allegiance. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3 (“Treason against the United States, shall consist
only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort.”). While
the requirement of allegiance thus appears to be a requirement in addition to the definition given in the
Constitution, Chief Justice Marshall wrote in an opinion that “[t]reason is a breach of allegiance, and can be
committed by him only who owes allegiance” and concluded that “[t]he words, therefore, ‘owing
allegiance to the United States,’ . . . are entirely surplus words.” United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76,
97 (1820).
6
See, e.g., NACHMAN BEN-YEHUDA, BETRAYALS AND TREASON: VIOLATIONS OF TRUST AND LOYALTY 107
(2001) (“Treason . . . consists of a behavior that is presumed to have betrayed trust and breached faith,”
and “establishing an act of treason requires an a priori act of establishing a relationship of trust and
loyalty.”).
7
http://twitter.com/SarahPalinUSA/status/9251635779866625.
8
James Fallows, On “Treason” and Julian Assange, THE ATLANTIC, Oct. 29, 2010, at
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/10/on-treason-and-julian-assange/65437.
9
The last wave of prosecutions for treason occurred after World War II. For a summary, see Tom W. Bell,
Treason, Technology, and Freedom of Expression, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 999, 1003-04 (2005). Most recently,
Adam Gadahn was indicted for treason for appearing in al-Qaeda propaganda videos. Dan Eggen & Karen
de Young, U.S. Supporter of Al-Qaeda Is Indicted on Treason Charge, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2006, at A3.
10
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 793-798.
11
See, e.g., Id. § 794; see also United States v. Zehe, 601 F. Supp. 196, 197 (D.C. Mass. 1985) (discussing
the case of Alfred Zehe, an East German citizen who was facing prosecution for “alleged acts of espionage
against the United States committed in Mexico and the German Federal Republic”).
12
18 U.S.C. § 794.
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citizens are accused of espionage, there is talk of treason and disloyalty, whereas if
Russian citizens are accused of espionage, there is instead talk of a “prisoner swap” with
the Russian government,13 as if crossing the border cancels out whatever criminality
might have existed on the other side.14 Hanssen, Ames, and the Rosenbergs are
commonly characterized as “traitors,”15 and it is a common misunderstanding that they
were convicted of treason, not espionage.16 Therefore, even though espionage laws on
their face do not distinguish between Americans and foreigners, the implication is clear;
there is an act of betrayal and disloyalty when the crime is committed by Americans
against the United States, and the legal system – not to mention the general public –
reacts accordingly.17
Treason and espionage are only the two most obvious crimes of betrayal and
disloyalty to the country. Some of the other federal crimes that likely implicate
disloyalty to the United States when committed by Americans are: helping a prisoner of
war or “enemy alien” held by the United States escape,18 sabotaging United States war or
defense activities,19 interfering with activities of the United States armed forces during a
time of war,20 recruiting soldiers to serve in armed hostility against the United States,21
and enlisting to serve in armed hostility against the United States.22
This Article examines the idea of betraying or being disloyal to one’s country as a
matter of criminal law by addressing two broad questions: “What does it mean to be
disloyal to one’s own country?” and “Is disloyalty to one’s own country morally
blameworthy?”

13

Peter Baker, et al., Swap Idea Emerged Early in Case of Russia Agents, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 9, 2010.
In fact, Russian agents who were deported recently from the United States received awards from the
Russian government. Associated Press, Russian Spies Receive Top Honours: Anna Chapman Among the
Sleeper Agents Deported from the US Given Awards by President Dmitry Medvedev, GUARDIAN, Oct. 19,
2010.
15
See, e.g., RICHARD SALE, TRAITORS: THE WORST ACTS OF TREASON IN AMERICAN HISTORY FROM
BENEDICT ARNOLD TO ROBERT HANSSEN (2003); DAVID WISE, SPY: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE FBI’S
ROBERT HANSSEN BETRAYED AMERICA (2003).
16
Cf. Thomas Vinciguerra, Satisfying the Constitution on Treason, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2006 (“Many of
the most infamous betrayals of national trust were not considered treasonous in a legal sense. Julius and
Ethel Rosenberg, for example, were convicted of espionage, not treason, for giving atomic secrets to the
Soviet Union.”).
17
See, e.g., GEORGE FLETCHER, LOYALTY 43 (1993) (“There is every likelihood that Weinberger’s branding
of Pollard a traitor contributed to Judge Robinson’s decision to impose a life sentence.”). This elision of
the distinction between treason and espionage was starkly displayed in the Rosenbergs’ case. When the
Rosenbergs challenged their conviction on the grounds that the “intent to betray” was not properly proven,
the court rejected the argument on the ground that the “intent to betray” was not an element of the crime
they were charged with. United States v. Rosenberg, 108 F. Supp. 798, 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (“The specific
intent required by the Statute to be proved as an element of the crime requires not a purpose to ‘betray’ the
United States . . . .”). But when they then challenged the sentence of the death penalty, the court rejected
that challenge on the ground that “their traitorous acts were of the highest degree,” stressing that
“[t]hroughout history the crimes of traitors stand as those most abhorred by people.” United States v.
Rosenberg, 109 F. Supp. 108, 109 (SDNY 1953).
18
18 U.S.C § 757.
19
Id. §§ 2153-2156.
20
Id. § 2388.
21
Id. § 2389.
22
Id. § 2390.
14
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In understanding the inquiry of this Article, it is important to distinguish among
the following three questions:
1) Is the state justified in punishing crimes of disloyalty to one’s own country?
2) Is the state justified in punishing disloyalty to one’s own country?
3) Is disloyalty to one’s own country blameworthy?
The first proposition differs from the second and the third in that it only asks
whether we can justify punishing those who commit crimes commonly understood to be
crimes of disloyalty to their country, which is different from punishing disloyalty to their
country. For example, if an American citizen levies war against the United States by
bombing a federal building, he or she should be punished, but one may still ask whether
the punishment is for causing harm or for betraying the United States. It is
uncontroversial that he is a criminal and should be punished, but the question this Article
asks is whether we can justifiably condemn the criminal, or morally blame the criminal,
for betraying his country.
The second proposition differs from the third in that it asks whether the state is
justified in punishing disloyalty to one’s own country. The answer to this question may
well be yes on consequentialist grounds according to an account like the following: In
order for a state to provide for, for example, national defense, it is important to prevent
people from acting disloyally. Punishment of disloyalty to one’s own country can serve
not only as a threat to those who may be tempted to be disloyal but also as an educative
device to instill in people the sense that it is wrong to be disloyal to their country.
Instances of disloyalty then should be punished in order to deter future acts of disloyalty
to one’s own country. This line of argumentation may persuade many, but it is, again,
separate from the question whether disloyalty to one’s own country is in fact
blameworthy.
The question of blameworthiness of disloyalty to one’s own country matters not
because there is any question as to whether treason or espionage should be criminalized.
It matters, rather, because it is clear that we do not just punish crimes of disloyalty; we
punish people for being disloyal to their country. Charges of disloyalty to one’s own
country can stir up deep emotional responses, and we should ask whether those who
commit crimes of disloyalty to their country and are disloyal deserve to be condemned
for being disloyal.
After introducing some preliminary distinctions as a way of defining the subject
matter of this Article in Part I, Part II addresses the question whether disloyalty to one’s
own country is morally blameworthy. Part II first raises some reasons to doubt that
disloyalty to the country is blameworthy by discussing the cosmopolitan notion that
national boundaries are morally insignificant. Part II then presents and evaluates several
potential explanations as to why disloyalty to one’s own country is blameworthy and
concludes that they are all deficient.
Part III argues that, given the difficulties in justifying punishing disloyalty to
one’s own country on retributivist grounds, we should reject the idea that disloyalty to
one’s own country is wrong. Rather, we should reinterpret the wrong of these crimes of
disloyalty to one’s own country as involving not betrayal or disloyalty but transgression
of political boundaries. In other words, the relevant wrong here is rooted in the idea of
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separation of powers between citizens and the state. If we reconceive of crimes of
disloyalty instead as crimes of “usurpation” or “foreign relations vigilantism,” we can
evaluate the moral rights and wrongs of these behaviors without the distraction of the
heated, yet morally unsupportable, accusations of betrayal.
A couple caveats are in order. First, crimes of disloyalty to the country,
especially treason and espionage, raise First Amendment problems in many instances. A
treason case may involve a propaganda video and an espionage case may involve leaking
classified documents to the press. Such First Amendment issues are controversial and
important,23 but I do not address them in this Article. Second, while much of this Article
is written in abstract theoretical terms, the focus of this Article is on the idea of disloyalty
to the country as a criminal matter in the United States. Many of the arguments I discuss
here could apply to other national contexts, but the general theoretical style of
argumentation should not be understood to be an ambition to provide an account that
applies universally. This Article is about Americans and the United States.
I.

What’s Wrong with Disloyalty?: Some Preliminary Issues

We first need to be clear about the object of disloyalty. What does it mean to
betray the United States? That is, who or what is the United States that we are trying to
protect from betrayal through criminal law? We may think of the United States as a
nation, defined as a community of people bound by common ancestry, history, or
tradition who seek to govern themselves with a set of political institutions.24 We may
alternatively think of the United States as a state, defined as a set of political institutions
that is organized to govern a particular territory and that, as Weber famously put it,
successfully lays claim to the monopoly of legitimate violence within a particular
territory.25 Finally, “nation” should be distinguished from “ethnic group,” which we
might say is a group of people sharing common ancestry and culture.26
So when we are talking about disloyalty as a criminal matter, who is exactly being
betrayed? One thing that is clear is that the contemplated victim of disloyalty cannot be
an ethnicity, as the United States is a multiethnic nation-state. Other than that, it is
difficult to say who exactly the victim of crimes of disloyalty is because real world
indictments, legal or otherwise, do not distinguish among potentially different objects of
betrayals when one is disloyal to the United States. I will argue below that we should
think of the duty not to be disloyal to the United States as being limited to the duty not to
be disloyal to the state, not the nation.
Second, what does it mean to be disloyal to one’s own country? We should start
with the idea of partiality, which is generally considered to be a crucial aspect of
“loyalty” and “disloyalty.” When a person is called “disloyal” to her own country, the
implication is that, contrary to expectations, she has failed to place the interests of her
23

For the latest, see Geoffrey R. Stone, An Overreaction to Wikileaks, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 5, 2011.
For further discussion, see, for example, GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME
FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2004).
24
See BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES 5-7 (1991); E.J. HOBSBAWM, NATIONS AND
NATIONALISM SINCE 1780: PROGRAMME, MYTH, REALITY 5-8 (1990).
25
Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 78 (H.H. Gerth & C.
Wright Mills eds. & trans., 1946) (1919).
26
See, e.g., MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 387-93 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1968).
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own country over that of other countries. Alasdair MacIntyre, for instance, argues that
patriotism, which he views as a kind of loyalty, entails that “I strive to further the
interests of my community and you strive to further those of yours.”27 Samuel Scheffler,
similarly, notes that loyalty requires “the assignment of priority to the interests of one’s
associates.”28 The relevant law reflects this idea of partiality. As noted above, the mens
rea requirement for an espionage crime is “with intent or reason to believe that it is to be
used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation,”29 and one
can be guilty of treason against the United States for “adhering to their enemies, giving
them aid and comfort.”30
A person may be said to be disloyal, then, when he fails to prioritize the interests
of his own community in an appropriate way. This by itself is too broad for our
purposes, however, as a mere preference for other countries’ interests can include
something as trivial as cheering for foreign athletes when they are competing against
one’s own country.31 Similarly, it seems clear that being “disloyal” to compatriots by
buying only foreign-made products (German cars, French wines, Finnish cellphones, and
so on), donating only to charities that serve the needy overseas, vacationing only in
foreign countries, living abroad for months at a time, and so on should not be within the
scope of disloyalty, especially not the kind that is morally wrongful or criminal.
In order for an act to rise to the level of criminal disloyalty against the United
States, it seems that it has to be directed against state instruments with sensitive national
defense implications. Other than treason, federal crimes listed earlier as implicating
disloyalty, such as espionage, helping prisoners of war escape, and sabotaging United
States military activities, all require support for, or at least non-interference of, core
institutional resources the state requires to protect itself (and by extension, the nation) or
to otherwise advance its interests by force.
From these considerations, we may arrive at the following generalization as the
first attempt at a definition of disloyalty: an “American” is disloyal to the United States
(as in the state or the nation) when he or she knowingly participates in efforts, either
directly or by helping others engaged in such efforts, to directly undermine core
institutional resources that the United States requires to protect itself or otherwise
advance its interests by force, and, in doing so, fails to prioritize the interests of the
United States in an appropriate manner.
Some caveats about the breadth of some of the terms used. First, there is a
question of what institutional resources the United States requires to protect itself or
advance its interests by force, and something like the Internal Revenue Service may be
considered to be such an institution, which is why the word “core” is included in the
27

Alasdair MacIntyre, Is Patriotism a Virtue?, in PATRIOTISM 43, 46 (Igor Primoratz ed., 2002).
Samuel Scheffler, Liberalism, Nationalism and Egalitarianism, in BOUNDARIES AND ALLEGIANCES:
PROBLEMS OF JUSTICE AND RESPONSIBILITY IN LIBERAL THOUGHT 66, 79 (2001).
29
18 U.S.C. § 794.
30
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3.
31
One potential distraction here with the example of “cheering” is that it seems to implicate the First
Amendment. In order to avoid such distractions, one might think instead about volunteering to carry water
bottles and towels for German soccer players about to play the American team or providing the French
swim team a free use of your private gym so they can gain a critical edge against the American team. The
point of these examples is to see that, even without the First Amendment problems, condemning such acts
as disloyal would be mistaken.
28

6
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1780393

formulation. Second, it may be possible to “undermine” institutional resources by, say,
refusing to pay taxes; the phrase “directly undermine” is used to distinguish such
instances. Third, the phrase “protect itself” can also be construed broadly to include
safeguarding American jobs and producers of American culture, such as General Motors
and Hollywood respectively, but what concerns us most here is “protect” as in preserving
“national security,” as the phrase is commonly understood. 32
This formulation does not answer all the questions, and it will go through some
modifications below, but I hope the gist of it is clear enough for it to be useful as a
starting point. The goal here is not to answer all line-drawing questions but to capture the
moment at which accusations of criminal disloyalty tend to legitimately arise.
II.

What’s Wrong with Disloyalty?: Some Possible Accounts
A. Cosmopolitan Challenge

In Woody Allen’s movie “Love and Death,” there is a scene in which a Russian
army sergeant explains to his soldiers about to go into battle against Napoleon’s army
that “if they kill more Russians, they win, if we kill more Frenchmen, we win.” Boris,
the character played by Woody Allen, is a Russian soldier, and he raises his hand at that
point and asks, in all earnestness, “What do we win?”
The moment is hilarious both because the question seems so out of place and
obviously inappropriate -- something only someone as clueless as Woody Allen’s
character would ask -- and because it is in fact a very good question. To Boris, the fact
that he is on one side as opposed to the other does not give him an independent reason to
want his side to win; he wants to know whether more can be said in terms of reasons why
he should support his side. Boris’ question makes sense because it is deeply mysterious
why one’s nationality should be thought to be morally significant. If we start with the
presumption that all people are of equal value and dignity, then why is it better for “our
side” to win and for the “other side” to lose such that we have a moral obligation to take
“our side”? If, in a situation of a conflict between two countries, we have a moral duty to
support the country we have a membership in and refrain from helping our country’s
enemy, such boundaries between countries must be capable of creating morally
significant distinctions. And it is not obvious whether that is the case.
In fact, a number of political philosophers -- under the banner of
“cosmopolitanism” -- have questioned the view that national boundaries are morally
significant.33 Martha Nussbaum, for example, writes in an oft-cited article that “[h]uman
32

The term “national security,” of course, is a difficult phrase to unpack. See, e.g., BARRY BUZAN, PEOPLE,
STATES & FEAR: AN AGENDA FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 16-23
(1991). For the purposes of this article, “national security” means “military security” and “political
security,” where military security involves armed forces and political security has to do with the stability of
political institutions. See BUZAN, supra, at 19.
33
There are many different kinds of cosmopolitanism, and different schemas abound. When I refer to
cosmopolitanism in this article, I am referring to a way of deliberating about morality, as opposed to a view
about how international institutions for global governance ought to be designed or a view about the
significance of culture for formation of individual identities. In other words, I am interested in “moral
cosmopolitanism,” not “cosmopolitanism about institutions” or “cosmopolitanism about culture.” See
CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 199 (2d ed., 1999); Samuel
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personhood . . . is the source of our moral worth, and this worth is equal.”34 This means
that we should “recognize humanity wherever it occurs, and give its fundamental
ingredients, reason and moral capacity, our first allegiance and respect.”35 Giving
national boundaries a significant role to play in one’s moral deliberation would be
indefensible, she argues, because the “accident of where one is born is just that, an
accident; any human being might have been born in any nation.”36 In other words, one’s
nationality is “morally irrelevant” 37 and national boundaries, similarly, “morally
arbitrary,”38 and we cannot justify our differential treatment of individuals on such
arbitrary grounds.39
Peter Singer also points out that “most of us unquestioningly support declarations
proclaiming that all humans have certain rights, and that all human life is of equal worth”
and that we “condemn those who say the life of a person of a different race or nationality
is of less account than the life of a person of our own race or nation.”40 But if such a set
of ideas is taken seriously, as Singer argues, it seems that we cannot coherently maintain
also that “national boundaries carry moral weight.”41 And, if national boundaries do not
carry moral weight, it is unclear whether there is a moral obligation to support your
country or at least refrain from helping your country’s enemy unless your country is on
the morally correct side of every conflict.
In short, despite the prevalent view that disloyalty to the country is blameworthy,
it is not at all clear theoretically why that is the case. This and the following Parts
consider several potential solutions to this puzzle.
B. Potential Answers to the Challenge
1. Moral Self and Relational Self
We should start by setting aside two well-known arguments. First, almost every
philosophical discussion of the moral status of patriotism begins with Alasdair
MacIntyre’s “Is Patriotism a Virtue?”42 MacIntyre argues that patriotism is not only a
virtue but the “central” virtue that holds together morality because we learn and
understand morality “in and through the way of life of some particular community” and
thus understand rules of morality “in some socially specific and particular form,” in
reference to “goods that are socially specific and particular.”43 He concludes that
Scheffler, Conceptions of Cosmopolitanism, in BOUNDARIES AND ALLEGIANCES, supra note 28, at 111,
111-12.
34
Martha C. Nussbaum, Reply, in FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY? 131, 133 (Joshua Cohen ed., 1996).
35
Martha C. Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, in FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY?, supra note 34, at 3,
7.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 5.
38
Id. at 14.
39
See also Thomas W. Pogge, An Egalitarian Law of Peoples, 23 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 195, 198-99 (1994);
Debra Satz, Equality of What Among Whom?: Thoughts on Cosmopolitanism, Statism, and Nationalism, in
GLOBAL JUSTICE 67, 67 (Ian Shapiro & Lea Brilmayer eds., 1999).
40
PETER SINGER, ONE WORLD: THE ETHICS OF GLOBALIZATION 152 (2002).
41
Id.
42
MacIntyre, supra note 27, at 48.
43
Id. at 49.
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“detached from my community, I will be apt to lose my hold upon all genuine standards
of judgment” and loyalty to the community is thus a “prerequisite for morality.”44 In
other words, the claim appears to be that, applied to the context of crimes of disloyalty,
those who commit such crimes are lost, morally speaking, because those who have lost
their allegiance to their communities have also lost their ability to be guided by morality.
The vision presented here is unpersuasive. MacIntyre is no doubt articulating an
important truth about how people develop as moral agents; however, he overstates his
case. He is suggesting that a person who is disloyal to his community would lose his
capacity for moral deliberation, and that is simply false. Even though we may receive
our moral educations from communities that we are born into and grow up in, the moral
capacities that we obtain can certainly be exercised to generate the conclusion that
sometimes the morally correct thing to do is to betray one’s country. That is, just because
one learns to be moral from being a member of one’s community does not mean that one
then may not criticize the source of one’s moral knowledge.45
Another common argument against cosmopolitanism accuses cosmopolitanism of
threatening the idea of partiality by questioning not only patriotism but also family ties
and friendships. For instance, if cosmopolitans are correct in thinking that all people are
of equal worth, it seems illegitimate for a father to give special priority to the interests of
his children over those of someone else’s children just because his children are his.46
This argument is fine as far as it goes, but only as far as it goes. Even if we grant
that relationships matter to people, are valuable, and are important ingredients of moral
lives, that does not show which relationships matter, which relationships are valuable,
and which relationships are so valuable that the we should treat the breach of
responsibilities stemming from such relationships as morally blameworthy. And in fact,
there is a serious disanalogy between intimate relationships like family and friends and
relationships among compatriots. Significant components of relationships among family
members and (at least good) friends are the number, type, and scope of direct
interpersonal interactions extending over significant periods of time. Obviously, we
cannot say the same for relationships between an individual and the state or among
compatriots. The state consists of large, impersonal organizations, and most people live
their lives having never met or otherwise interacted with most of their compatriots.
Therefore, there is something prima facie dubious about arguments that justify loyalty to
one’s country by drawing attention to the importance of family relationships in one’s life.
Another difference between intimate relationships and the citizen-state
relationship is as follows. When we talk about various actions we perform as spouses,
parents, children, friends, and colleagues, a simple statement to the effect of “That’s what
a husband is supposed to do,” “That’s what friends do,” and so on is sufficient, and a
demand for a further specification beyond that is often thought to be odd and misguided,
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Id. at 50.
MacIntyre does not deny, by the way, that a person can criticize his country and still have his moral
faculties intact. A patriot can criticize “the status quo of power and government and the policies pursued
by those exercising power and government” yet still be loyal to his country. MacIntyre, supra note 27, at
52. Loyal to what exactly? The answer is loyal to “the nation conceived as a project.” Id. But of course
this nuance does not rescue the core argument from its implausibility, given that what MacIntyre does deny
is that a person can criticize “the nation conceived as a project” and still retain his moral faculties.
46
Scheffler, supra note 33, at 118.
45
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typically leading one to think “one thought too many,” in Bernard Williams’ well-known
formulation.47
This move, however, is unavailable to those who seek to justify the existence of
an analogous obligation to the state. What makes “one thought too many” an argument,
as opposed to just a slogan, is the thought that it is incoherent for a person to attempt to
justify some of his or her most fundamental commitments because it is precisely those
commitments that constitute who that person is. Meeting the demand for an external
justification for the person’s commitment would require the person to step outside of
himself, and that is where the mistake is, according to the communitarian view.48 What
this means is that for this type of argument to ground an obligation to the state, one’s
political identity has to be one of those identities that are impossible to separate from
one’s conception of the self, and this is implausible -- for reasons related to the
aforementioned reasons to question the analogy between family and the state.
In short, philosophers like Andrew Oldenquist have attempted to argue from
examples involving fathers and drowning children to justify the idea of loyalty to one’s
country by pointing out that the “contempt we feel toward traitors is not unlike what we
feel toward the father who lets his daughter drown,”49 but that is much too quick. We
cannot argue in favor of a moral duty of loyalty to one’s country by making general
arguments about the importance of special relationships and special obligations for
human flourishing or for moral deliberations.50 The force of the cosmopolitan challenge
that national boundaries are not and, morally speaking, should not be significant does not
diminish because we do not know whether our relationships to our compatriots fall into
those kinds of relationships that are independent sources of moral obligation. Therefore,
we need to examine the nature of one’s relationship to one’s country on its own terms in
order to evaluate the moral blameworthiness of one’s disloyalty to the country.
2. Value of Nations
As discussed above, the object of disloyalty in cases of disloyalty to one’s country
is ambiguous: disloyalty to the nation or disloyalty to the state? We have stated above
that the United States is a state of one nation of multiple ethnicities. One may be then
disloyal against the nation or the state, and we need to treat each object of disloyalty
separately. This section examines the idea that betraying one’s nation is wrong.
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Bernard Williams, Persons, Character, and Morality, in MORAL LUCK 1, 18 (1981).
See, e.g., CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY 25-32
(1989); MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 179-83 (1982).
49
Andrew Oldenquist, Loyalties, 79 J. PHIL. 173, 187 (1982); see also Thomas Hurka, The Justification of
National Partiality, in THE MORALITY OF NATIONALISM 139, 149 (Robert McKim & Jeff McMahan eds.,
1997) (“Because the arena in which partiality seems most clearly justified is the family, defenders of
nationalism often try to assimilate the relations among conations to those among family members.”); Jeff
McMahan, The Limits of National Partiality, in THE MORALITY OF NATIONALISM, supra, at 107, 111 (“A
common defense of nationalism consists in comparing nations to families, thereby assimilating national
partiality to the paradigm of partiality within the family.”).
50
On this point, see McMahan, supra note 49, at 112 (“Indeed, all the various special relations have been
thought to justify departures from impartiality -- love, friendship, parenthood, conationality, citizenship,
and so on -- seem sui generis; none is relevantly quite like any other. Each has to be understood on its own
terms . . . .”).
48
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In order to establish something like an allegiance to one’s nation, one might start
from the significance of nations for people’s lives. There is much written on the value of
national membership, and some breathtaking claims have been made.51 According to
various defenders of nationalism, national membership is valuable for at least three
reasons. First, national membership is essential for autonomous living because the very
ability of an individual to make choices that are meaningful owes its existence to the
cultural environment that he or she inhabits.52 Second, national membership makes it
possible for individuals to transcend their everyday existence by imbuing a greater
meaning – national significance – to the ordinary life.53 Third, national membership
helps people belong to a community with shared goals and mutual responsibilities.54
Assuming these various assertions about the value of belonging to a nation are
correct, can such benefits of national community generate moral obligations of loyalty,
which would in turn support the proposition that disloyal acts are morally blameworthy
because they would undermine the health of, and threaten the existence of, one’s own
nation?
One possible answer is that if national membership is important to individuals in
these various ways, then we have an obligation to foster them. If nations help people
pursue autonomous lives by providing a context for their choices, help people give
meaning to their lives by helping them draw connections to the grand narrative of their
nation, and provide people with a sense of belonging to a community, then we should
support the perpetuation and flourishing of these cultures. One might argue, then, that an
obligation to support your nation and refrain from helping your nation’s enemies
naturally follows from this insight as to the importance of national membership.55
The problem with this argument is that the autonomy, transcendence, and
community arguments give one a reason to support any nation, not just one’s own. If
51

Some of the authors I am about to discuss use the term “nation.” Others use the term “people” or
“culture” or “encompassing group.” Instead of getting bogged down on what term each author uses, I am
going to treat these terms as interchangeable, not because I believe they all mean the same thing, but in
order to identify a common strand of thought that has emerged in writings of various contemporary
political philosophers.
52
Will Kymlicka is a prominent proponent of this view. See, e.g., WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL
CITIZENSHIP 80-82, 87-90 (1995). Similar arguments have been made by others. See, e.g., YAEL TAMIR,
LIBERAL NATIONALISM 84 (1993); Avishai Margalit & Joseph Raz, National Self-Determination, 87 J.
PHIL. 439 (1990).
53
See, e.g., TAMIR, supra note 52, at 85; see also Neil MacCormick, Nations and Nationalism, in
THEORIZING NATIONALISM 189, 193 (Ronald Beiner ed., 1999).
54
See, e.g., TAMIR, supra note 52, at 85-86; Margalit & Raz, supra note 52, at 452.
55
Charles Taylor has made an argument of this sort, when he said: “If we . . . affirm[] the worth of certain
human capacities, . . . , then any proof that these capacities can only develop in society or in a society of a
certain kind is a proof that we ought to belong to or sustain society or this kind of society.” Charles Taylor,
Atomism, in PHILOSOPHY & THE HUMAN SCIENCES: 2 PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 187, 197 (1985). That is, if
culture can create certain goods that contribute to individual well-being, then those who value such goods
should also “want to preserve and strengthen this culture.” Id.; see also Charles Taylor, Irreducibly Social
Goods, in PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS, at 136-37 (1995) (“As individuals we value certain things; we find
certain fulfillments good, certain experiences satisfying, certain outcomes positive. But these things can
only be good in that certain way, or satisfying or positive after their particular fashion, because of the
background understanding developed in our culture. . . . If these things are goods, then other things being
equal so is the culture that makes them possible. If I want to maximize these goods, then I must want to
preserve and strengthen this culture.”).
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national cultures should be protected because of their importance to individual wellbeing, then one might argue that every person has an obligation to support protection and
flourishing of national cultures, but these arguments do not specify which nations should
be supported by individuals.56 The topic we are addressing is disloyalty, and arguments
based on general virtues of national cultures for individuals do not urge individuals to be
loyal to their own cultures. Rather, the implication of the arguments seems to be that
perhaps every existing nation should be protected and supported by everyone;57 it says
nothing about why people ought to support their own nations. In short, from the premise,
“Nations are great for individual well-being and should therefore be supported,” the
conclusion, “Therefore, you should support your own nation,” does not follow.
Some would disagree with this conclusion. Some have argued that we can derive
an argument in favor of prioritizing those close to us over others from arguments that
apply universally. Robert Goodin argues, for instance, “hospital patients are better cared
for by being assigned to particular doctors rather than having all of the hospital’s doctors
devote one nth of their time to each of the hospital’s n patients.”58 Similarly, we may
think, the universalist argument in favor of nationalism can generate an argument in favor
of loyalty to one’s own nation because cultivation and fostering of nations as a general
matter would be done most effectively if people focused on supporting their own nations
and fighting enemies of their nation. If this is the case, then injuring state institutions
may be blameworthy for undermining the health of your own nation because everyone
has a duty to support his or her own nation.
There are two problems with this argument. First, it sets up a false dichotomy.
One’s choices are not in fact limited to supporting either one’s own nation or supporting
all nations at once. Framed in this way, it is obviously the case that it would make more
sense to support one’s own nation than attempt to support all nations. However, that is
not the correct way to frame the issue. The question is, given the choice between
supporting one’s own and supporting someone else’s nation, why should one choose
56

In the movie Love and Death mentioned above, when Boris asks the question, “What do we win?” the
answer he receives is as follows: “Imagine your loved ones conquered by Napoleon and forced to live
under French rule. Do you want them to eat that rich food and those heavy sauces? Do you want them to
have soufflé every meal and croissant?” The answer of course does not appear to satisfy Boris. The deep
point here is that if a highly developed culture A is replaced by a highly developed culture B, the loss to
particular individuals living in it is unclear -- at least past the initial transitional period, which could
concededly be painful for members of culture A -- if one of the important benefits of nationhood is a sense
of self importantly fueled by one’s cuisine.
57
In fact, the value of nations implies even less than that. First, there is the possibility of individuals
converting from one nationality to another. As long as individuals belong to some cultures, individuals can
take the benefits of belonging to a culture, which in turn means that not all existing nations even need to
continue to exist in order for individuals to draw benefits of national membership. Of course, how far this
argument can go depends on the ability of individuals to truly belong to different nations. Second, if nation
A deems the existence of nation B to threaten its own well-being, then the arguments in favor of national
membership would be pointing in two conflicting directions – towards eliminating B for the health of A and
towards protecting B to protect its nationhood even if it means hurting A.
58
Robert Goodin, What Is So Special About Our Countrymen?, 98 ETHICS 663, 681 (1988). For a similar
argument, see Nussbaum, supra note 35, at 13 (“Politics, like child care, will be poorly done if each thinks
herself equally responsible for all, rather than giving the immediate surroundings special attention and
care.”); see also 136 (“If I tried to help all the world’s children a little bit, rather than to devote an immense
amount of love and care to Rachel Nussbaum, I would be no good at all as a parent.”). Cf. Peter Railton,
Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 134 (1984).
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one’s own as opposed to the other’s? That is, when choosing between supporting one
and supporting every other nation, the choice seems clear, but when choosing between
your nation and someone else’s, the universalist perspective offers no guidance as to why
you should support your own as opposed to the other.
Perhaps we can get around this problem by making an efficiency-based argument
in favor of everyone being assigned to his or her own nation. It is easier and less costly
for people as a general matter to help those that are close to them for various reasons
having to do with our cognitive and emotive limitations. The transaction costs of
assigning benefactors to beneficiaries, coordinating services, and making sure everyone is
getting what they are supposed to be getting may be too high to justify the expense of
doing it any other way. Therefore, one may argue that each national should support his
or her own nation because doing it any other way would be a waste of resources and most
likely less effective.
This brings us to the second problem with this way of deriving an argument in
favor of loyalty to your nation from the benefits of robust national cultures. Although it
may justify condemning disloyalty, it would do so for reasons that seem oddly detached
from the way people in fact think about what is wrong with disloyalty and why they
should not engage in acts of disloyalty. People think that they should support their own
countries because these are their own countries, not because they believe that countries
should be supported as a general matter and their own happens to be the one it is most
efficient for them to support. As Anthony Appiah has put it, “You don’t value your wife
because you value wives generally, and this one happens to be yours.”59 Similarly, there
is something odd about defending the state’s demand of allegiance on the basis of the
argument that because nations are wonderful generally everyone has a duty to support the
nation that is his or her own. What is needed is a reason for one to value one’s own
nation in particular.
I do not mean to deny that many Americans do in fact value their nation in
particular. And those who do indeed feel this way would feel guilt and would feel that
they have betrayed the nation if they commit acts of disloyalty, and they will resent other
Americans who commit such acts. There is no reason to disrespect or discount the
validity of such sentiments, but acknowledging so need not involve the belief that that is
how everyone who is “American” should in fact feel. Judging people on the basis of the
fact that they do not feel that they “belong” to their own nation to which they owe
corresponding obligations essentially imposes on people an obligation to belong.
Is there such an obligation? As a general matter, no, and the state cannot
legitimately fault individuals for not identifying with the nation associated with it.60 Of
course, to what extent the state demands that people belong to the nation may differ
depending on each state’s citizenship laws, and even then there will be troubling
questions as to whether states can legitimately hold people criminally culpable for not
identifying with the nation. But at least in the context of the United States, we can safely
state that all citizens have a duty not to be disloyal against the United States, yet not all
citizens are expected to be “American” in the cultural sense.
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KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, ETHICS OF IDENTITY 226 (2005).
Cf. Joseph Raz, The Obligation to Obey: Revision and Tradition, in ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN:
ESSAYS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, 341, 354 (1995).
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In short, there is no demand that individuals identify themselves as “American” as
a matter of personal and cultural identity. If we are going to find the source of the moral
obligation not to betray the United States, we should look at America the state, not the
nation. One implication of this conclusion is that the definition of disloyalty given above
should be refined. The new definition, which focuses on the state, is as follows: An
“American” is disloyal to the United States (as in the state) when he or she knowingly
participates in efforts, either directly or by helping others engaged in such efforts, to
directly undermine core institutional resources that the United States requires to protect
itself or otherwise advance its interests by force, and, in doing so, fails to prioritize the
interests of the United States in an appropriate manner.
3. Value of States
So, if being loyal to one’s nation is one way of living a meaningful life among
many that the state may not require people to adopt as their own, can we draw a duty to
be loyal to one’s country by thinking about it in terms of a duty to one’s state? I defined
“nation” above as a community of people bound by common ancestry, history, or
tradition who seek to govern themselves with a set of political institutions. “State,” on
the other hand, may be thought to be those political institutions. Therefore, whatever
obligations one may have to his nation have to do with his personal identity as a bearer of
culture, history, and tradition, whereas obligations one has to his state have to do with the
relationship he has to his state as a member of the polity. In other words, one’s acts of
disloyalty to the state may be morally blameworthy because they violate their political
obligations, or obligations individuals owe to their state by virtue of their relationship to
the state.61
We can start by discussing what makes states valuable. The typical definition of a
state as a set of political institutions organized to govern a particular territory that
successfully lays claim to the monopoly of legitimate violence within the territory62 tells
us how to tell whether something is a state but does not tell us what a state is good for,
and why supporting a state may be morally required. The state does a number of things,
including protecting the physical safety of those within its territory from attacks from one
another and from people outside the territory, operating a system of dispute resolution
spanning from police force to administrative agencies to the judicial branch, solving
coordination problems by establishing and enforcing conventions, such as rules of the
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There is a large literature on the “problem of political obligation,” and the related topic of the duty to
obey the law. See, e.g., A. JOHN SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES AND POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS (1979);
CAROLE PATEMAN, THE PROBLEM OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION (2d ed. 1979); LESLIE GREEN, THE
AUTHORITY OF THE STATE (1988); JOHN HORTON, POLITICAL OBLIGATION (1992); GEORGE KLOSKO,
POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS (2005); MARGARET GILBERT, A THEORY OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION (2006).
Unlike this literature, the discussion that follows focuses on the question of disloyalty as opposed to the
question of disobedience.
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For other discussions of the concept of the state, see, for example GREEN, supra note 61, at 63-88;
KLOSKO, supra note 61, at 21-42; DAVID MILLER, ANARCHISM 5 (1984). For illuminating discussions of
the requirement of monopoly of legitimate violence, see GREEN, supra note 61, at 78-83; ROBERT NOZICK,
ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 23-24 (1974).
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road, and so on.63 There are debates about whether the state is necessary to provide these
goods,64 but that is not our concern here. All that we are interested in here is, given that
the state exists, and given that it does these things, what can we say about the moral
rights and wrongs of injuring the state?
The answer to this question seems obvious. It is morally blameworthy to injure
institutions of the state because the state carries out valuable functions that make it
possible for individuals to live normal lives as we understand normalcy today, and
injuring state institutions would cause harm to individuals’ lives.65 But the question we
are trying to answer is not whether offenses against the state should be outlawed; it is
obvious that they should be. The question, rather, is whether one of the reasons crimes of
injuring the state are blameworthy is because they are acts of disloyalty.
The problem is that harm-based accounts are, by their form, universalistic. If
helping an enemy attack the United States is wrong simply because it participates in harm
production, then it must be the case that helping the United States attack an enemy is
wrong, too, and that does not correspond to the idea of disloyalty as a wrong. If passing
military secrets from the United States to Russia is wrong only because it can potentially
cause harm, then passing military secrets from Russia to the United States is wrong, too,
and, again, that is not how we understand the meaning of disloyalty. That is, what is
wrong with crimes of disloyalty is not a question that can be answered through a straight
harm-based account because such an account does not distinguish between harm to one’s
own country and harm to other countries.66 In order to give a disloyalty-based account of
these crimes, we must have an explanation as to why harming one’s own state is a
distinct wrong, apart from and beyond the fact that it is wrong to produce harm.
4. Fairness
One way of thinking about what kinds of relationship citizens have to their state is
in terms that John Rawls lays out in his discussion of the duty of fairness, or fair play.
He explains as follows:
63

While it is difficult to come up with a list of functions as uniquely state functions, see GREEN, supra note
61, at 68-69, we can still make some general statements about what states do. A good discussion can be
found in KLOSKO, supra note 61, at 21-42.
64
For a defense of the state on such grounds, see KLOSKO, supra note 61, at 17-59.
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We should note, however, that this conclusion could be questioned. First, one might argue that replacing
one set of political institutions with another set of institutions can be morally justified if it can be done with
minimum disruption to people’s lives, with little or no violence, and with reasonable compensations for
those whose reasonable expectations would be frustrated by the regime change. Of course, costs of such a
transition would have to be justified by its benefits, which brings us to the second point. Even if the cost of
transition from one polity to another is high, blood or no blood, one might also argue that such a transition
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there are short-term costs. See Matthew Noah Smith, Rethinking Sovereignty, Rethinking Revolution, 36
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injuring state institutions need not necessarily be morally blameworthy, but I will not pursue this avenue
further because avoiding the conclusion that injuring states is morally blameworthy requires piling on too
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Requirement, 10 LEGAL THEORY 97 (2004); Jeremy Waldron, Special Ties and Natural Duties, 22 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 3 (1993).
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The main idea is that when a number of persons engage in a mutually
advantageous cooperative venture according to rules, and thus restrict their
liberty in ways necessary to yield advantages for all, those who have
submitted to these restrictions have a right to a similar acquiescence on the
part of those who have benefited from their submission. We are not to
gain from the cooperative labors of others without doing our fair share.67
Whether the duty of fair play embodies a correct moral principle and whether it can
ground political obligations have been vigorously debated.68 The main intuition here is
that of wrongness of free-riding. People who cut in line benefit from others’ following
the rules without doing their fair share. People who litter after enjoying a nice picnic at a
neighborhood garden kept clean by people cleaning up after themselves benefit from
others’ cooperation without doing their share of cleaning.
Can we think of the duty not to be disloyal against one’s own state to follow from
the duty of fair play? It appears that way at first. The state can be plausibly described as
a “mutually advantageous cooperative venture,” which “restrict[s] liberties in ways
necessary to yield advantages for all.” One such restriction may take the form of the rule
prohibiting acts of betrayal, such as treason or espionage, and “those who have submitted
to these restrictions” by avoiding such activities, one might say, “have a right to similar
acquiescence on the part of those who have benefited from their submission.”
But there are problems. First of all, there is a distinction to be made between
those who are passive recipients of benefits from others’ labors and those who seek to
benefit from others’ cooperation without doing their fair share. The latter group is whom
we think of when we think about free-riding. In Robert Nozick’s well-known criticism of
the duty of fair play, he may not have succeeded in undermining the principle completely,
but his discussion of situations when benefits are essentially given to people without prior
agreement are valuable at least for highlighting this distinction.69 Nozick asks us to
imagine a public entertainment system that provides entertainment on a daily basis in
one’s neighborhood or a man who gets his best exercise by throwing books into people’s
homes, and argues that “[o]ne cannot, whatever one’s purposes, just act so as to give
people benefits and then demand (or seize) payment.”70
Some have argued that benefits provided by governments are similar to Nozick’s
examples in that they have the feature of providing benefits to individuals without their
having actively taken such benefits, in which case basing political obligations on the idea
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JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 342-43 (1971). For another canonical formulation, see H.L.A. Hart,
Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 175, 185 (1955).
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See, e.g., SIMMONS, supra note 61, at 101-42; A. John Simmons, Fair Play and Political Obligation:
Twenty Years Later, in JUSTIFICATION AND LEGITIMACY: ESSAYS ON RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS 27 (2001);
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For a discussion that brings this out nicely, see SIMMONS, supra note 61, at 118-36.
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NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE & UTOPIA, supra note 62, at 95. More current examples of situations where
one should not be accused of free-riding or shirking one’s own obligation to cooperate just because one has
benefited without paying for the benefits may be Wikipedia and Craigslist.
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of fair play becomes problematic.71 Such observations gave rise to an endless debate
over the validity of Nozick’s arguments in terms of the differences between: receiving
benefits and accepting benefits, taking benefits and not avoiding benefits thrown in one’s
way, valuable goods which give rise to obligations and trivial goods which do not, and so
on.72
Instead of attempting to resolve this debate here by adding my voice to an already
crowded conversation, I note two things. First, there is a reason to at least hesitate about
the idea of the state providing mandatory or practically mandatory benefits to its citizens
and giving them the following three choices: refrain from disloyal acts in return, be
condemned as free riders, or leave the country to avoid receiving the benefits. Second,
this problem, if it is a problem at all, is not as serious for naturalized citizens as it is for
others who were born into their citizenship because we may presume that naturalized
citizens have voluntarily applied to partake in benefits of this particular citizenship. Even
in the case of naturalized citizens, however, there is a concern that once they accept the
benefits, it is not easy for them to extricate themselves from the benefits. It would be like
signing up for a lifetime subscription for a magazine without ever being able to terminate
it and with payments being demanded for as long as one lives.
Another problem with the strategy of grounding the duty not to be disloyal on the
duty of fair play is that it is unclear whether disloyalty is properly characterized as a
problem of free riding at all. I see (literal) free riders often when I take the subway; free
riders are those who take certain benefits (in this case of public transportation) without
assuming the associated burdens (paying for tickets). A free rider may want the benefits
to continue and simply does not want to contribute knowing that others will contribute a
sufficient amount to continue to provide the benefits.73 Such people are rightly looked
down upon as a general matter, but that moral disapproval has as its target a different
wrong from the wrong of disloyalty. Free riders want the cooperative venture that
provides benefits to continue -- they just do not want to pay for it -- whereas the core
wrong of disloyalty seems to involve committing acts that damage, weaken, or undermine
the cooperative venture. Imagine a Vietnam War veteran who pays all his taxes turning
to espionage as a side source of income.74 Such a person would certainly be considered a
traitor, while he may or may not be a free rider given that he has paid more than his share
for national defense.
There may be two responses to this observation. First, as noted above, it is not
difficult to frame disloyalty as a problem of fairness. If the state is a “mutually
advantageous cooperative venture,” then it is not difficult to imagine it prohibiting acts of
71
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disloyalty as a way of “restrict[ing] liberties in ways necessary to yield advantages for
all.” Therefore, even if disloyalty and free riding are different in important ways, that
does not threaten the fair play account of disloyalty, the argument might go. What this
response highlights is that, once we distance ourselves from the intuition of the
wrongness of free-riding, the principle of fairness appears to be too capacious to be of
much use in explaining what is wrong with various crimes. It turns out that restrictions
of liberties in ways necessary to yield advantages to all in a society can cover the entire
criminal code and more; laws against murder, rape, physical assault and so on are all
restrictions “necessary to yield advantages to all” in the “mutually advantageous
cooperative venture” called society.75 If we are interested in finding out what is
distinctively wrong about disloyalty, the principle of fairness, interpreted broadly, is thus
a poor guide.
The second response brings us back to the idea of free riding. Disloyalty, the
argument would go, is like free riding after all. There may be a couple ways to describe
disloyalty as a form of free riding. First, in order to have a state function as an effective
entity, it needs not only cooperation from its members in terms of following the law, but
also loyal members who are committed to the long-term health and existence of the
polity. People who are not loyal are then free riders in the sense that they are deriving
benefits from those who contribute more to the advancement of the common good. Even
though this may be correct as a description of what goes on in various group settings, it
does not work as an explanation of crimes of disloyalty because it cuts too broadly.
There are those who are lazy, indifferent, or lack any sense of civic duty, and we may call
such people nonloyal. Nonloyal people may benefit from the work of those who devote
more of their time and efforts to being engaged citizens (at the very least, by voting).
Even if we may think of such people as not “loyal,” it seems excessively harsh to label
such people “disloyal” when they do not do anything that amounts to a betrayal and all
they do is simply put in less effort than others.
Second, one may think that disloyalty is problematic because it is a way of
“keeping one’s options open.” That is, during a war between two countries, a member of
one state may conceal his activities as a spy for the other country, with the result being
that, no matter which side wins, he will be protected. The wrong here, then, is the wrong
of “hedging,” which free rides on the efforts of those who have committed to one side or
the other in advance and have risked being on the losing side. This does not quite work,
either, however. There are two kinds of traitors – those who betray openly and those who
betray in secret. The “hedgers” – the free riding traitors – betray in secret because being
open about one’s betrayal defeats the purpose of hedging. This means that the wrongness
of betraying and the wrongness of hedging are separate from each other, and disloyalty
cannot be reduced to a form of hedging.
In short, if we interpret the duty of fairness narrowly as essentially a duty not to
free-ride, then it seems to point at a wrong distinct from disloyalty, but if we interpret it
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In fact, Herbert Morris’ famous essay “Persons and Punishment” took precisely this path in arguing that
punishment is justified because criminals have benefited without shouldering the burdens of obeying the
law. Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 MONIST 475 (1968). While influential, the argument
has the bizarre implication that we should think of murder and rape as “unfair benefits” taken by murderers
and rapists. For similar criticisms see R.A. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS 211-14 (1991).
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broadly as a duty to play by the rules, then it can capture so many different types of
wrongs that it ceases to be useful as a way of understanding disloyalty.
5. Consent
Another familiar possibility is consent. A consent-based theory, for our purposes,
would impose a duty on members of a state not to betray the state on the basis of their
agreement not to do so. Consent arguments are thought to have some obvious defects,
but I would argue that there are important insights to derive from consent theories even if
they ultimately fail to explain why disloyalty is blameworthy.
The problem with an express-consent theory of political obligations is now
familiar. It cannot be the ground to establish political obligations that bind every member
of the state simply because very few people have made such explicit commitments, and
there would be numerous problems with asking people to go through a process where
they can give express consent.76 This problem has led some consent theorists, including,
most (in)famously, John Locke, to appeal to the idea of tacit consent.77 The idea of tacit
consent has been severely criticized for various reasons, mainly having to do with the
conceit that mere residence or receipt of benefits can amount to an act of consent to be
ruled.78 The problem with the consent theory, however, lies elsewhere for the purposes
of this Article because it turns out that even if we limit the scope of our inquiry to just
those who have expressly promised allegiance to the state, we will still have trouble
understanding what is wrong with disloyalty and have to look for other ways of thinking
about the obligation not to betray.
There are two groups of people who have taken explicit oaths of allegiance:
public officers, including members of the military, and naturalized citizens. The wording
of various oaths taken by federal office holders is different, but they all include languages
of allegiance such as “preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United
States,”79 “support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies,
foreign and domestic,”80 or “bear true faith and allegiance to [the United States].”81 The
citizenship oath taken by naturalized citizens is similar:
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See KLOSKO, supra note 61, at 122-40; FLETCHER, supra note 17, at 53-55.
JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (C.B. MacPherson ed., Hackett 1980) (1690). For a
discussion, see Hanna Pitkin, Obligation and Consent -- I, 59 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 990, 994-97 (1965);
SIMMONS, supra note 61, at 83-95.
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I hereby declare, on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce and
abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or
sovereignty of whom or which I have heretofore been a subject or citizen;
that I will support and defend the Constitution and laws of the United
States of America against all enemies, foreign or domestic; that I will bear
true faith and allegiance to the same; that I will bear arms on behalf of the
United States when required by the law; that I will perform noncombatant
service in the Armed Forces of the United States when required by the
law; that I will perform work of national importance under civilian
direction when required by the law; and that I take this obligation freely
without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; so help me God.82
Such promises to defend the United States Constitution against all enemies are easy to
interpret to include a commitment not to betray the United States through acts of treason
or espionage.
To be sure, there is an important difference between oaths taken by holders of
public offices and oaths taken by naturalized citizens. The duration the oaths remain in
effect varies in the two situations. Although no particular term limit is spelled out in
oaths taken by holders of public office, they do not last indefinitely. Rather, they are tied
to the office that the oath-takers are about to enter. The presumption then should be that
the duty not to be disloyal lasts only as long as the term of the office. There could be
residual obligations even after someone leaves the office, especially if the particular way
in which someone commits acts of disloyalty can be traced to his tenure in the office, but
the outer parameters of the oath would be determined by the term of the office. For
naturalized citizens, by contrast, the oath is in effect for as long as they live. It is true that
naturalized citizens can always renounce their citizenship, the same way that public
officers can quit and free themselves from the obligations, but giving up a citizenship is
far more costly than changing jobs. This difference matters for the validity of the consent
given because there are reasons to question promises of indefinite durations without easy
exit options when there is much uncertainty as to what the future holds.
None of this is to argue that the oath taken by naturalized citizens is invalid as a
matter of consent. We may debate over whether people are always free to leave their
own country and question whether one’s decision to stay amounts to consent to be
governed by the state, but entering a new country and actively seeking a citizenship in it
should be considered to be, generally speaking, voluntary.83 And neither is it the case
that, as far as the duty not to betray is concerned, the terms of the promise are so vague
and uncertain that the existence of a valid promise is in doubt. The only point being
made here is that, all other things being equal, there are features of the citizenship oath
82

The part of the oath that requires renunciation of “all allegiance to fidelity to any foreign prince,
potentate, state, or sovereignty of whom or which I have heretofore been a subject or citizen” has never
been enforced and is looking outdated. See PETER SPIRO, BEYOND CITIZENSHIP: AMERICAN IDENTITY
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that make it more suspect as a promise than the oath that public officers take upon
entering their offices.
Now, if it also turns out that the demands of the oath are stringent, then we may
take the further step of considering the promise of naturalized citizens to be invalid.
Fortunately, for the duties that this Article is focusing on, it does not seem that
particularly stringent demands are being made. The duty not to be disloyal by avoiding
aiding the country’s enemy and avoiding revealing military secrets to foreign entities is a
duty that can be performed while sitting on a couch and watching Mad Men. It does not
take much to satisfy such duties, and agreeing to satisfy such duties as a condition of
obtaining the citizenship is not an unreasonable demand.84
Therefore, it seems that we can safely conclude that at least those who take oaths
of allegiance – holders of public positions and naturalized citizens – are under a duty not
to be disloyal. Does this mean that, at least for these two groups of people, we have
answered our question whether the state may legitimately blame people for being
disloyal?
Not quite. Perhaps the existence of some kind of obligation not to be disloyal is
secured through the oaths of allegiance; however, we have to ask the further question of
what exactly is the nature of wrongdoing when obligations of allegiance established
through an oath are breached. When someone breaks a promise by performing an act,
there are potentially two wrongs, the wrongness of promise breaking and the wrongness
of the act itself. This is because when someone makes a promise to do x, it is understood
that the promise creates a new obligation to do x over and above the pre-existing reasons
to do x, and breaking the promise entails a violation of the promissory obligation as well
as going against the reasons to do x that existed before the promise was made.85 Why
breaking a promise is wrong is a topic that has been much debated, but it is unnecessary
here to commit to any particular account of the nature of its wrongness.86 The only point
being made is that there is an independent wrong that is associated with breaking a
promise that is separate from the wrong of committing the conduct underlying the breach.
This means that when public officers or naturalized citizens commit acts of
disloyalty, we may blame them for violating their oaths or for being disloyal, and the
argument that those who have taken the oaths of allegiance have an obligation not to be
disloyal is sufficient to establish the duty not to be disloyal but cannot establish further
that the state may blame them for the wrongness of betraying. In other words, the
consent theory cannot justify the practice of taking people’s acts of disloyalty to be
blameworthy. At most, what we have established here is that public officers and
naturalized citizens have duties not to be disloyal on the grounds that they have given
84
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their express consent to be under a duty not to be disloyal. Thus, when a naturalized
citizen commits an act of disloyalty we may blame him not only for being disloyal but
also for breaking a promise. It is the blame for being disloyal part, however, that still
remains to be explained.
Furthermore, I would argue that even when we condemn public officers and
naturalized citizens for being disloyal, the part of our condemnation having to do with
breaking of the promise is rather insignificant. This is because, properly understood, the
significance of the oath lies not in the fact that one is making a promise to undertake
certain specific obligations; rather, what the oath does is express one’s undertaking of a
certain position or a role, which comes with certain obligations. The oath is thus not like
signing a contract and promising to perform various terms of the contract; the oath rather
is an expression of intent to enter a role and assume a set of responsibilities that come
with the role.
In this way, the oath of allegiance to the state is analogous to marriage vows.
When vows are spoken during a marriage ceremony, the bride and groom are expressing
their assumption of a role that comes with certain duties, one of which is the duty of
loyalty. And if a husband is unfaithful to his wife, the core wrongness of his acts lies in
the fact that he betrayed his wife, and the fact that he also happened to have broken his
promise by itself is too feeble to account for our understanding of the wrong that was
committed. Breaking one’s oath of public office or citizenship oath through performing
acts of disloyalty should be understood in the same way – as acceptances of roles that
come with certain obligations – a public official or a citizen.87
For all of these reasons, we need not go into the various problems of theories of
“tacit consent” to expose the deficiencies of the consent theory as a way of explaining
why disloyalty is blameworthy. It turns out that even in instances in which we find
express consent to a duty of allegiance, consent is not sufficient to do the job of
explaining what is wrong with disloyalty.
6. Trust
Can we appeal to the idea of violation of trust to understand punishing disloyalty?
Violation of trust may be thought of as a wrong, and it is closely related to betrayal – so
closely related, in fact, that some would define disloyalty as violation of trust. The idea
of violation of trust, however, is illuminating only for some phenomena and not for
others. Here, we again need to distinguish between naturalized citizens and public
officers on one hand and other members of society on the other hand. As we saw above
in our discussion of consent, naturalized citizens and public officers appear different from
other citizens because it may be argued that through a voluntary application and
assumption of citizenship or public offices, these people have induced others’ trust, and if
they behave disloyally, then there is nothing wrong with describing them as having
violated others’ or the state’s trust. Therefore, it seems that we have fairly clear instances
of betrayal as a violation of trust in these cases, and we can analyze espionage cases
involving those whose positions give them access to classified materials as violation of
trust cases. Cases of Aldrich Ames, a C.I.A. agent, and Robert Hanssen, an F.B.I. agent,
87

The use of the word “citizen” is not meant to exclude others who may have a sufficiently thick
relationship with a state to be considered a member of the state, which may include permanent residents.

22
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1780393

fall into this category, and we might also argue that naturalized citizens who transmit
classified materials to other governments violate our trust from two sources, one
stemming from the naturalization process and the other from his or her position of trust
and access to classified information.
But what about the rest? Isn’t there a case of misplaced trust if other members of
society have not done anything affirmative to encourage others to trust them? And
wouldn’t there also be a case of misplaced trust if we trust a harsh and persistent critic of
the United States and its government’s deeds? In what sense has there been a violation of
trust if a United States citizen, say, makes propaganda videos for Al Qaeda?88 Who
trusted him and why? We expect the government to punish those who commit crimes
because the government uses its coercive power to reassure the rest of us that we can play
by the rules without fear of being taken advantage of or having our efforts be wasted.
But I am not sure how we can say that we trust people to not commit acts of disloyalty.
In fact, as a general matter, we do not trust one another, and that is why the state uses a
variety of tools, some coercive others less so, to induce desirable behavior from people.
Trust is also an inappropriate concept here because normally people can avoid
being trusted to act in a certain way through the practice of full disclosure, but that is not
an option in this context. For instance, imagine Claire, a U.S. citizen who gets up every
morning and recites the following anti-oath in public before going to work:
I hereby declare that I am a U.S. citizen, but that I will not support and
defend the Constitution and laws of the United States of America against
all enemies, foreign or domestic; that I will not bear true faith and
allegiance to the same; that I will not bear arms on behalf of the United
States when required by the law; that I will not perform noncombatant
service in the Armed Forces of the United States when required by the
law; and that I will not perform work of national importance under civilian
direction when required by the law.
If “trust” is what is at issue, and if betrayals consist in violations of trust, then it seems
that we would have no right to complain about Claire’s betrayal if she does commit acts
of disloyalty because she is clearly begging not be trusted here. The duty not to be
disloyal against the government is not something that one can free oneself of simply by
denouncing the government or taking an oath like the one above.89 Therefore, if we are
interested in giving an account that applies to naturalized citizens, public officers, and
other members of society alike, trust is of limited use as an explanatory concept.
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In fact, it is not easy to lose one’s citizenship. For basic requirements, see 8 U.S.C. § 1481. See also
Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d 962 (1950) (finding that a statement of allegiance to Germany typed on a
piece of paper and signed by an American citizen and submitted to her work supervisor in Germany during
World War II was insufficient to cause a loss of citizenship).

23
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1780393

7. Gratitude
In the discussion of the natural duty accounts above, we listed a number of
valuable functions the state carries out, such as national defense, dispute resolution,
social coordination, and so on. Even though it was argued above that the fact that the
state provides these services does not justify an obligation to be loyal to one’s own state
as opposed to an obligation to support reasonably just states generally, it is sometimes
argued that citizens owe a duty to support their own state because they have received
benefits from it in numerous ways.90 Those who commit acts of disloyalty should be
condemned, on this account, because they are ingrates who take benefits from the state
and return the favor by hurting it.
The gratitude argument as a way of grounding political obligations has been
criticized. It has been argued, for instance, that while the duty of gratitude may be
sufficient to generate a duty to express one’s gratitude in some adequate fashion, it is too
vague to generate political obligations,91 and that gratitude is to feel in a certain way and
it is inappropriate for the government to require that people have certain feelings.92 It has
also been argued that gratitude is appropriate only when special effort has been expended
by the benefactor to provide benefits and when the benefactor provides such benefits with
right motives. The government does not seem to satisfy either condition, simply because
thinking of the state as a being capable of expending efforts and acting with right motives
quickly brings us to a land of metaphysical obscurity.93 These objections are successful
in defeating the gratitude argument to various degrees.94 For our purposes, though, it
seems that the vagueness objection is not a worry given that no matter how vague the
requirements of the duty of gratitude to the government may be, it seems that we can
safely say that being disloyal to the government is in violation of them. Also, the
requirement of gratitude need not be construed as a requirement to have certain feelings;
it is perfectly coherent to think of it as a duty to make appropriate expressions of
gratitude or a duty to avoid acts expressing ingratitude.95
For the purposes of this Article, which is to examine potential grounds for persons
not to betray the state, the biggest weakness of the gratitude argument is exposed once we
think of states and institutions as beings capable of bestowing benefits and expecting
gratitude in return. If it is coherent to talk of institutions in this way, the list of
benefactors to whom individuals owe duties to express gratitude in some way starts to
grow very quickly.
First, we cannot ignore globalization as a phenomenon when we start looking for
things to thank for giving our lives their current shape. International cooperation and
90

See, e.g., A.D.M. Walker, Political Obligation and the Argument from Gratitude, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
191 (1988).
91
SIMMONS, supra note 61, at 167-68, 185-86.
92
Id. at 166-67.
93
Id. at 187-89.
94
For a good discussion, see William A. Edmundson, State of the Art: the Duty to Obey the Law, 10 LEGAL
THEORY 215, 243-45 (2004).
95
This means that your expression of gratitude may be insincere, but this only means that the obligation to
express gratitude may be satisfied perfectly or imperfectly. A person may have trouble having genuine
feelings of gratitude yet may still go through the motions because, objectively speaking, he feels that he
owes an expression of gratitude nevertheless.

24
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1780393

international institutions are needed to address various issues that can affect individuals’
day to day lives – such as finance, trade, terrorism, climate, diseases, and nuclear
proliferation.96 People benefit from not just their own state but from other states and
international bodies, and the logic of the gratitude theory sets us on a path of calculating
who is providing benefits to whom.
Also, for individual Americans, how the gratitude calculus works out is likely to
vary greatly. Some Americans were born in other countries and raised there before they
came to the United States. Some college students study abroad and are changed
profoundly forever. Some build their careers on importing overseas cultural products and
selling them to the American public. In short, if we can identify what benefits come to
individuals from where, then the direction of gratitude is likely to be not only diffuse but
also would map out differently for different individuals. Therefore, gratitude to
benefactors is a highly unreliable and messy way of arriving at duties of individuals to
their states.97 This is not just an objection based on pragmatic considerations; the
argument is that the gratitude account does not track the way we generally think about
who has the duty not to be disloyal towards whom.
Gratitude-based accounts of disloyalty also have trouble with the real
phenomenon of people around the world having feelings of gratitude towards the United
States for various reasons. Such sentiments were recently on display in Normandy for
instance, during its sixty-fifth year commemoration of the Normandy landings during the
Second World War. Countries around the world continue to depend on the United States
military to preserve their own security. Droves of foreigners come to the United States
each year to enroll in graduate schools. Some of them stay, but many go back to their
home countries. Should we start demanding a duty of loyalty to the United States from
all of these people? Would it ever make sense to accuse them of treason if they decide to
steal American secrets and pass them around since they received benefits from the United
States? The point is that the duty not to be disloyal against the state does not operate on a
sliding scale that adjusts according to people’s backgrounds and particular emotional
identifications, but gratitude accounts do not have internal constraints to avoid such
implications.
III.

Usurpation, not Disloyalty

The central puzzle this Article has sought to resolve is the following: when two
people, an American citizen and a Russian citizen, commit the crime of delivering United
States military secrets to a foreign government, is there a difference between the two
cases? We started this Article with the idea that there is a difference between the two
cases in that we can blame the American for disloyalty whereas such a conclusion would
be inappropriate for the Russian, even though both broke the same law. The various
theoretical attempts outlined in Part II all fail to explain and justify this intuition, and one
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possible conclusion to draw from all this is that there is no such thing as a duty not to be
disloyal to one’s own country and that we should thus dismiss the Russian-American
difference as illusory.
Another possibility is to ask if the intuition has some basis other than disloyalty.
To make some headway here, let’s think about what it would mean for people to
undertake the acts that we have been assuming to be “disloyal.” First, take the case of
treason. If the United States is at war against another country, say Iraq, it would be
treasonous for an American to help Iraqi war efforts by going to Iraq and working as a
volunteer for the Iraqi military. One may of course go to Iraq during a time of war for
humanitarian reasons, to help Iraqi civilians whose lives have been adversely affected by
war, to monitor potential human rights abuses and violations of laws of war, and so on.
We can put such acts aside as not treasonous, even if they would incidentally have the
effect of boosting the morale of the Iraqi army. But what if a person believes that the
right thing for him to do is to help the Iraqis with the goal of defeating America in the
war?
There may be several reasons for such an act, depending on the situation. It may
be thought that the United States is a hegemon with imperial ambitions that should be
curbed in order to prevent further damage to international affairs,98 with the long-term net
result of an American defeat being better for the world as a whole than its victory. Or it
may be thought that the quickest way to end the war with the lowest number of military
and civilian casualties on both sides is for the United States to be defeated soundly. For
example, the Vietnam War may not have dragged on for as long as it did if it had become
obvious early on to the United States government that its efforts were futile.99 Or it may
be thought that the United States is on the wrong side of this particular conflict, morally
speaking, and that it is morally permissible to participate in the war on the side opposing
the United States. If the United States is engaging in an act of aggression, the Iraqis may
simply be innocent actors defending themselves, in which case helping the Iraqis defend
against the U.S. attack is a simple case of defense of others.100
What about espionage? Is there an argument for engaging in acts of espionage?
Again, there may be many reasons why one might think that passing along, say, United
States military secrets is a good idea. For instance, one might think that national security
is a good – it contributes to a sense of safety that enables people to pursue normal
lives,101 and a country’s military power can enhance its ability to defend itself against
potential aggressors, and one might accordingly believe that the United States military
secrets can be useful to some other country’s national security, which in turn would
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benefit that country’s inhabitants.102 It might also be believed that if countries that worry
about American military interventions learn more about the American military, these
countries will benefit from obtaining American military secrets and better prepare
themselves for a potential attack from the United States. If American interventions in
general or in particular instances are thought to be potentially an awful idea then one
might think that there is nothing wrong with preventing such interventions by weakening
the United States military or strengthening the potential targets of the United States
military intervention.103 In addition, military power enhances a country’s bargaining
position in the world,104 and to the extent that the United States has an unfair advantage
in this arena, one might think that revealing U.S. military secrets to others is a way of
leveling the playing field. Moreover, to the extent that citizens in wealthy countries
benefit from the current system of inequalities, one might say that they in fact have a
moral duty to work towards undoing the system of inequality, perhaps by distributing
military intelligence to other countries that may lack such resources and are thus in
positions of vulnerability. Some might even argue that sending military secrets to some
countries would mean those countries would be able to spend less on military and more
on, say, social welfare, which would be a tremendous gain for the individuals living in
those states.
What is wrong with positions like these? One obvious response is that basing
one’s behavior on these sorts of arguments is unwise. Most of these behaviors carry the
risk of doing more harm than good, and morally responsible individuals would probably
refrain from engaging in them. But this way of thinking about what is wrong with such
acts speaks in terms of what kinds of harms such acts would bring about and is thus
limited. First, it cannot well explain why we do not engage in case-by-case
determinations to see whether individual “disloyal” acts undertaken are in fact harmful all
things considered. Second, being a harm-based argument, it has the same defect as other
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harm-based arguments considered above. Namely, it cannot explain the difference
between the Russian spy and the American spy.
To resolve this puzzle, I suggest that we view the wrongfulness of these acts of
“disloyalty” as consisting not of harm or even disloyalty, but what one might call
“usurpation” or “foreign relations vigilantism.” The problem with these “disloyal” acts is
that they cross the boundaries that are set up to protect the state monopoly of violence.
The state, as mentioned above, fulfills various valuable functions. The state goes about
its business in the name of its people, and physical security is not only one of the main
functions of the state but is a precondition of the cooperative activity of governing and
being governed together as members of a polity. This cooperative venture, in turn,
cannot exist and continue unless it has physical security, and the state achieves this
through a particular configuration of power between the state and its citizens, and one
core feature of this configuration is the state monopoly on violence.105
Members of the state are, then, required to refrain from engaging in activities that
threaten the core institutional resources the state requires to protect itself. When a citizen
participates in efforts to undermine the core institutional resources the state requires to
protect itself, the citizen disturbs the way in which power is distributed within the polity
and enters a domain of exclusive governmental power. In short, the relevant wrong here
should be thought of as usurpation of state power.106
Can this account explain the difference between the Russian spy and the
American spy? It may appear that the answer to this question is no because it seems that
both the Russian and the American have interfered with the monopoly of violence held
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by the United States within the United States. The appearance is not entirely correct,
however, because there is a crucial difference between the Russian and the American; the
American is related to the United States government in a way that the Russian is not. The
state monopoly of violence is a political idea in the sense that it effects a separation of
powers between the state and its citizens and assigns different roles to each. When an
American steals state secrets from his own government, he is breaking the terms that
control the way in which power is shared between him, his government, and among all
members of the society, but when a Russian steals from the American government, there
is no equivalent wrong because he is not involved in a power-sharing arrangement with
the American government or its people.
One might say, then, that the wrong here consists in a breach of a role
obligation.107 While the term “role obligations” by itself is not terribly informative since
it does not spell out what the relevant obligation is, it is useful in highlighting the
difference between the American and the Russian. The United States assigns the
American in the example one role – that of a citizen, whereas the Russian is assigned a
different role – that of a guest, and the difference between the two is explained by the fact
that their otherwise identical acts of espionage breach different role obligations. The
Russian fails to fulfill his obligation to be a polite guest who is expected to be wellbehaved in ways that matter to the United States; the American fails to fulfill his
obligation to be a citizen who respects and abides by a particular allocation of power
between him and the state.
An important difference between usurpation and disloyalty is that usurpation,
unlike disloyalty, is not about prioritizing the interests of one’s own community or
associates. Rather, it is about respecting boundaries and the way in which power is
allocated. Under this account, one may be a citizen of country A, believe that country B’s
interests are more valuable overall, and work in ways to promote country B’s interests
over those of country A every time but still avoid being “disloyal” as long as he respects
these political boundaries. Conversely, one may be a citizen of country A and promote
country A’s interests over those of other countries at all times but can still be “disloyal” if
he transgresses the relevant boundaries. Therefore, under the proposed account, the idea
of partiality in the sense of prioritizing interests drops out, while the special and
particularistic aspect of the obligation a citizen owes to the state is preserved.
As a consequence, we need to rework the working definition of disloyalty so that
it reads as follows: An “American” is guilty of “disloyalty” to the United States (as in
the state) when he or she knowingly participates in efforts, either directly or by helping
others engaged in such efforts, to directly undermine core institutional resources that the
United States requires to protect itself or otherwise advance its interests by force. There
are two revisions here. First, there are scare quotes around the word “disloyalty” because
the very idea here is to reject our reliance on the term. Second, the clause, “in doing so,
fails to prioritize the interests of the United States in an appropriate manner,” is omitted
for the reasons explained above.
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Now, one might object, is it not possible to make a role-obligations-based
argument to establish the duty not to be disloyal? That is, why not simply say that
members of the state are prohibited from prioritizing the interests of other countries or
competing entities in certain ways, and that is an obligation that comes with the role of
citizenship? The problem with this idea is that the role obligations argument for the
disloyalty account remains vulnerable to the cosmopolitan challenge because the idea of
prioritizing the state’s interest is of crucial importance for the disloyalty account.
Because the usurpation account is not similarly related to the idea of prioritizing interests
one way or the other, it is less vulnerable to the charge that it violates the principle that
people are of equal worth.
Putting things in terms of a role obligation not to usurp the government’s
exclusive power has a number of further advantages over the disloyalty account. First,
let’s reexamine the original definition of disloyalty: An “American” is disloyal to the
United States (as in the state) when he or she knowingly participates in efforts, either
directly or by helping others engaged in such efforts, to directly undermine core
institutional resources that the United States requires to protect itself or otherwise
advance its interests by force, and, in doing so, fails to prioritize the interests of the
United States in an appropriate manner. This definition may work tolerably well to
describe crimes that we normally consider to be crimes of disloyalty; nevertheless, the
term disloyalty can be inapposite. For instance, is an American who sells American state
secrets to China disloyal to the country even though he himself has no interest in how the
competition between the two countries for global dominance shakes out? Here is
someone whose heart does not belong to China or the United States but only to himself.
It is debatable whether this is a genuine case of betrayal, but it is easy to assimilate the
scenario as a case of usurpation.
Second, a usurpation account does a better job explaining why we do not see the
distinction between betraying state secrets to enemy and ally nations in this area of the
law, except in the case of treason. The Jonathan Pollard case,108 for instance, is
controversial because some believe that there is a difference between spying for an
enemy and spying for an ally.109 If the real issue here had to do with the idea of betrayal,
then some distinction between friends and enemies seems plausible, the way a person
may reveal a friend’s secret to their mutual friend with the belief that the mutual friend
would not use the information against the friend. However, the law’s treatment of
Pollard’s conduct -- he is serving a life sentence in prison110 -- has not differed much due
to his status as a spy for an ally. Part of the explanation for this has to do with the belief
that some of the information he passed on to Israel was given to the former Soviet
Union,111 and part of the explanation has to do with the fact that he indeed betrayed the
United States by abusing the trust placed in him as an intelligence analyst. It seems to
me, however, that a deeper explanation of his conviction and punishment is that he
committed the wrong of interfering with the United States intelligence systems and
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thereby stepped into the government’s exclusive territory, and the concept of usurpation
makes no distinction between spying for friends and spying for enemies.
Finally, a person may “directly undermine core institutional resources that the
United States requires to protect itself” but in order to protect the United States from a
greater harm. Arguably, Daniel Ellsberg’s leaking of the Pentagon Papers to the New
York Times satisfies the definition of disloyalty given here, yet, again arguably, it would
be wrong to characterize his actions as disloyal because his acts were ultimately acts of
patriotism. That is, sometimes one’s concern for the well-being of one’s object of loyalty
may lead one to commit criminal acts, such as stealing and revealing state secrets, but it
would be inaccurate to characterize such acts as disloyal. If stealing state secrets were
truly a crime of disloyalty, then Ellsberg’s lawbreaking would be an awkward fit, and we
could imagine some pressure to invent something like a patriotism defense, but no such
thing exists. By contrast, if we imagine his crime as an instance of usurpation, no such
difficulty arises.
Now, one objection here may be that the usurpation account is insufficiently fullblooded to capture what is actually wrong with crimes of disloyalty. The crime of
treason, after all, is defined as “adher[ing]” to “enemies” and “giving them aid and
comfort,” which sounds like it is a crime of infidelity. Furthermore, “intent to betray” is
an element of the crime of treason, and the idea of usurpation does not sit well with the
idea of giving “intent to betray” an important role to play. However, I would argue that
the shift from the language of infidelity and betrayal to usurpation does not entail as big
an interpretive loss as it might look at first. George Fletcher has observed, albeit with
some exaggeration, that “[g]overnments seem no longer to care about actual sentiments
of loyalty” and those accused of espionage “are prosecuted for their acts of conveying
information, and not for their emotional disloyalty and identification with a foreign
power.”112 Similarly, in a recent article, Kristen Eichensehr argues that the courts have
“refocused [the] law of treason via court interpretations away from internal attitudes and
toward external actions.”113 Given the small number of cases, it seems to me difficult to
draw firm conclusions about the law of treason, but if Fletcher and Eichensehr’s reading
of the law is correct, the account I am proposing here would be less revisionist than it
would at first appear.
Plus, I would argue that even though the account proposed here seems quite
distant from the idea of betrayal, this aspect of the account is a strength and not a
weakness. For one thing, there is something, to use a technical term, creepy about the
state making demands about where one’s heart belongs. Consider Douglas Husak’s
example:
Suppose that two persons, Jane and Jill, each attend the same anti-war
demonstration. Jane attends in order to aid the enemy. She knows that her
boyfriend will be at the rally and wants to impress him with her interest in
politics, but does not attend for this reason. She would have participated
in the rally even if she had been certain that her boyfriend would not be
there. By contrast, Jill knows that her attendance will aid the enemy, but
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does not participate in order to further this objective. She attends because
she wants to impress her boyfriend, and would not demonstrate if she
knew he would not be there. The criminal law makes Jane but not Jill
guilty of treason. . . . The wrong committed by Jane . . . is incredibly
serious, qualifying for a severe punishment.114
As Husak notes, the caselaw is actually not very clear, and it is unclear whether Jane’s
activities would count as a legitimate case of treason.115 The more important point here,
though, is whether it would be desirable to place so much legal significance on the
difference in states of minds of Jane and Jill in this case. The more importance we place
on “intent to betray,” the more plausible the differential treatment of Jane and Jill
becomes, but at the same time the more it starts to look like an instance of punishment for
thoughts, emotions, or attitudes. Given that the relationship at issue is that between state
and citizen and not person to person, it seems to me appropriate to drain out some of the
more emotional elements from the concept of punishing disloyalty.
CONCLUSION
Charges of treason, betrayal, and disloyalty tend to invite heated rhetoric. George
Fletcher states in his book Loyalty that “[t]he worst epithets are reserved for the sin of
betrayal” and that “betrayal of country,” being “[w]orse than murder [and] worse than
incest, . . . invites universal scorn.”116 He adds that “[t]he language of treason and
treachery incites passions”117 and describes treason as “stress[ing] internal commitment”
and “emotional attachment.”118
This Article has addressed the question whether such passions are appropriate in
this context by examining the idea that disloyalty to one’s country is morally
blameworthy. This Article has argued that various arguments commonly raised -- such as
those based on harm, consent, fairness and gratitude, just to name a few -- to explain why
disloyalty to the country is blameworthy fail. Given the difficulties in justifying the idea
that disloyalty is morally blameworthy, the Article then argued, we should look for a
retributivist account of crimes of disloyalty elsewhere.
More specifically, this article has argued that we should reinterpret the wrong of
disloyalty crimes as involving not betrayal or disloyalty, but usurpation. In other words,
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the relevant wrong here is rooted in the idea of separation of powers between citizens and
the state, and we should reconceive crimes of disloyalty as crimes of usurpation or
“foreign relations vigilantism” and evaluate the moral rights and wrongs of these
behaviors accordingly.
Thinking of these crimes in this way has the virtue of helping us avoid the
confusing and emotional talk of loyalty, patriotism, and fidelity. The focus of our
attention should instead be on whether government officials are doing their job and
earning their keep as exclusive holders and exercisers of state power. The idea of
usurpation would encourage a more rational and levelheaded discourse about what is
truly at stake in this area of law, which is not loyalty, but power -- who has it, what one
can do with it, and how its particular allocation and uses are justified.
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